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Recent Developments 
Somuah v. Flachs 
A Client has Cause to Discharge an Attorney when the Client has Any Good Faith 
Basis For Being Dissatisfied with the Attorney, Even though the Attorney had 
Performed Competently 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a client 
may discharge an attorney when the 
client has a good faith basis for being 
dissatisfied with the attorney, even 
when the attorney had performed 
competently and committed no serious 
. misconduct. Somuah v. Flachs, 352 
Md. 241, 721 A.2d 680 (1998). The 
court further held that if this good faith 
discharge occurs, the attorney could 
recover for the services rendered prior 
to been discharged on a quantum 
meruit theory, however, in contingency 
fee contracts, the attorney could only 
recover if and when the contingency 
generating the fee occurs. 
Millicent Somuah ("Somuah") 
and her daughter sustained serious 
injuries in an automobile accident while 
travelling through Maryland in May 
1992. Id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683. 
Attorney Jeremy Flachs ("Flachs") 
visited and interviewed Somuah while 
she was still recovering in a hospital 
in Maryland, at which time Somuah 
retained Flachs to represent her in a 
personal injury claim on a contingent 
fee basis. Id. After Flachs had spent 
a considerable amount of time and 
money to investigate the claim and to 
collect and preserve evidence, 
Somuah discharged Flachs in August 
1992 after Flachs informed Somuah 
that he was not licensed to practice 
law in the State of Maryland. Id. at 
248, 721 A.2d at 683. Somuah 
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refused to pay Flachs for the services 
rendered prior to the discharge. Id. 
Flachs sued Somuah in the 
Circuit Court for Prince George's 
County to recover reasonable fees for 
the legal services rendered for Somuah . 
prior to his discharge. Id Following 
a jury trial, the court entered judgment 
in favor of Flachs. Id. Somuah 
appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals ofMaryland, which affirmed, 
holding that "[Flachs's] failure to 
inform [Somuah] that he was not 
licensed in Maryland did not constitute 
good cause to discharge [Flachs], so 
as to preclude his right to immediate 
compensation for the reasonable 
value of services rendered prior to 
[Flachs's] discharge." Id at 249, 721 
A.2d at 684. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari and 
reversed. Id. 
Beginning its analysis, the court 
of appeals rejected the court of 
special appeals' conclusion that a 
client's right to discharge an attorney 
was limited to situations where the 
attorney-client contract was invalid, or 
when the attorney had violated any of 
the rules of professional responsibility, 
a law, or the attorney-client 
agreement. Id at 250, 721 A.2d at 
684. Explaining the broad powers of 
a client, the court of appeals opined 
that an "attorney's authority to act for 
the client is freely revocable by the 
client," even for subjective reasons. 
Id. The court noted that the 
confidential nature of the relationship, 
coupled with the dangers of friction 
and loss of confidence, warrants a 
client's right for such power to end 
the relationship when necessary. Id 
at 251, 721 A.2d at 684. The court 
reasoned that a client's power to 
discharge an attorney is implied in the 
retainer agreement and therefore a 
client who discharges an attorney, 
even without good cause, does not 
breach the agreement if the discharge 
was "based on a reasonable 
subjective dissatisfaction with the 
attorney's services." Id. at251, 721 
A.2d at 684-85. The absolute right 
of a client to discharge an attorney, 
according to the court, is not altered 
in any way by a contingent fee 
contract. Id. at 251, 721 A.2d at 
685. 
Because this was the first time 
the court addressed what constitutes 
a proper basis for terminating an 
attorney-client relationship, the court 
discussed its prior rulings concerning 
appropriate circumstances under 
which an attorney's compensation 
may be forfeited and rulings by other 
jurisdictions that have addressed 
causes for termination of an attorney-
client relationship. Id. The court 
noted that in other jurisdictions almost 
any good faith reason the client 
asserted constituted cause for 
termination, and most courts 
permitted recovery on the theory of 
quantummeruit. Id.at252, 721 A.2d 
at 685. 
The court further reasoned that 
because the attorney-client 
relationship is analogous to an 
employer-employee relationship, a 
contract to employ an attorney is 
terminable at will if the client becomes 
dissatisfied with the services of the 
attorney. Id. at 255,721 A.2d 687. 
The court noted that a client who has 
no basis for being dissatisfied with the 
attorney's performance, or who has 
discharged the attorney in bad faith, 
is deemed to have no just cause for 
discharge whereas a good faith basis 
for a client's dissatisfaction is a proper 
cause for discharge. Id. Proof of 
incompetence, misrepresentation, 
fraud, deceit, or a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct are not 
requirements for discharge, rather any 
good faith basis for a client's 
dissatisfaction with the attorney's 
representation would justify a 
discharge. Id. at 256, 721 A.2d at 
687. 
The court determined that after 
the initial contact between Flachs and 
Somuah, it was reasonable for 
Somuah to have expected that Flachs 
could handle any court proceeding. 
Id. at 257, 721 A.2d at 688. 
Therefore, Flachs' later disclosure that 
he could not represent Somuah 
without engaging local counsel 
provided Somuah with a good faith 
basis to be dissatisfied with the 
representation. Id. 
The court held that if a 
dissatisfied client discharged an 
attorney based on a good faith reason, 
though not serious misconduct 
warranting forfeiture of fees, the 
attorney was entitled to recover 
compensation for the services 
rendered prior to the discharge. Id. 
at 258, 721 A.2d 688. Such 
recovery amount, the court 
determined, depends on the 
reasonable value of the benefits the 
client received and the nature and 
gravity of the cause of the discharge. 
Id. 
The court rejected Somuah's 
argumentthat Flachs's failure to infonn 
her that he was not licensed to practice 
in Maryland constituted an unlawful 
practice oflaw and precluded Flachs 
from recovery. Id at 262, 721 A.2d 
at 690. The court, instead, 
determined that Flachs's mere 
investigation of the personal injury 
claim, by gathering and preserving 
evidence in Maryland where he was 
not licensed, did not constitute an 
unauthorized practice oflaw. Id The 
court concluded that although Flachs 
was discharged for good cause, the 
basis for his discharge did not justify 
the forfeiture of his compensation for 
the services rendered. Id. at 264, 721 
A.2d at 691. 
The court reasoned that 
permitting a discharged attorney to 
recover on a quantum meruit theory 
prevents unjust enrichmentto the client 
for the services the attorney rendered 
prior to discharge. Id at 263, 721 
A.2d at 691. Furthermore, noted the 
court, the quantum meruit recovery 
balances the interest of preserving the 
right of the client to discharge his 
attorney without undue restrictions 
against "the attorney's right to fair 
compensation for services 
competently rendered prior to 
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discharge." Id at 264-265, 721 A.2d 
at 691. 
Among the factors to be 
considered in determining the 
reasonable value of the services of a 
discharged attorney, the court noted 
that the most salient factor is the extent 
to which the attorney's services have 
benefited the client. Id. at 265, 721 
A.2d at 692. Reiterating its adoption 
of the "New York Rule," the court 
emphasized that a client's discharge 
of an attorney without cause prompts 
an immediate accrual of the attorney's 
quantum meruit action, even in 
contingency fee contracts. Id at 267, 
721 A.2d at 693. In Somuah, 
however, the court held that because 
the client had a good faith basis for 
being dissatisfied with the attorney 
coupled with the contingent nature of 
the fee contract, Flachs' s quantum 
meruit recovery was conditioned upon 
Somuah's recovery in her personal 
injuryaction. Id.267-268, 721 A.2d 
693. 
The dissent argued that Sornuah 
terminated the attorney-client 
relationship without a material breach 
on the part ofFlachs, and therefore, 
the quantum meruit recovery 
"unconditionally accrued at the time 
oftermination." Id. at 276, 721 A.2d 
at 697 (citing Skeens v. Miller, 331 
Md. 331,628 A.2d 185 (1993)). By 
holding otherwise, the dissent argued, 
the majority has in effect overruled 
Skeens. Id 
In Somuah v. Flachs, the court 
of appeals enunciated a client's "good 
faith basis" for discharging an attorney, 
providing an intermediate standard 
between "good cause" and "without 
good cause." This, the court 
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explained, would preserve the client's 
absolute right to discharge an attorney 
if the client has a reasonable basis to 
be dissatisfied with the attorney. The 
court's distinction between "good 
cause" and "good faith basis" for 
discharging an attorney may create 
some confusion in its application. Trial 
judges may find it difficultto distinguish 
a "good faith basis" from a "good 
cause" for discharge. Based on the 
evidence in the case, the court could 
have simply concluded that Somuah 
discharged Flachs without good 
cause, and would have arrived at the 
same result that Flachs could recover 
his fees on quantum meruit theory. 
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